Using data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), we examine whether patterns of workplace cooperation occur disproportionately among workers of the same race. We find that, holding constant the composition of teammates on the floor, basketball players are no more likely to complete an assist to a player of the same race than a player of a different race. Our confidence interval allows us to reject even small amounts of same race bias in passing patterns. Our findings suggest that high levels of interracial cooperation can occur in a setting in which workers are operating in a highly visible setting with strong incentives to behave efficiently.
Introduction
Recent research shows that when individuals are forced to make quick decisions, they often exhibit same-race preferences, even if they are unwilling to admit to negative racial attitudes. For example, Price and Wolfers (2007) show that NBA referees are more likely to call fouls against players of a different race than themselves. Similarly, Antonovics and Knight (2005) find that police are more likely to search the vehicle of someone of a different race and Donohue and Levitt (2001) find that an increase in the number of police of a certain race is associated with an increase in arrests of people of the other race.
This same race bias could also play an important role in collaboration among colleagues in a workplace. For example, managers might be more likely to assign favorable work assignments to same-race employees. Alternatively, colleagues may depend disproportionately on same-race colleagues for advice or help. Collectively, such decisions may reduce the workplace productivity and satisfaction of employees of a minority race. These decisions may also play a role in explaining the extent of workplace segregation (Hellerstein and Neumark 2008) . Furthermore, this bias would undermine the argument that productivity increases from having an ethnically diverse set of employees.
In traditional firm-level data, it is often difficult to obtain measures of cooperation.
1 As a result, we use play-by-play data from the National Basketball Association (NBA). This data allows us to determine for each basket completed who passed the ball and which other players were on the court at the time. We develop a 1 One innovative approach to measure interactions in a college setting is the number of emails sent between two students (Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006) . simple model which allows the optimal pass to depend on the particular combination of teammates on the floor. We then test whether the pattern of observed assists demonstrates evidence of same-race bias.
We find no evidence that conditional on the set of teammates on the court, players are more likely to pass to a teammate of their same race. Our baseline empirical strategy controls non-parametrically for the joint distribution of shot quality for all teammates on the floor. In other words, we account for differences in ability across teammates.
Furthermore, the shooting opportunities of one teammate are allowed to depend arbitrarily on the set of other teammates on the floor. Robustness checks in which we reduce the flexibility of our empirical specification to increase statistical precision yield the same substantive results. Our evidence suggests that in workplace environments in which employees have a common goal and extensive experience working with each other, cross-race cooperation is unlikely to be a problem.
We now continue our analysis with a brief discussion of prior literature on racial bias in sports and the workplace. We follow with a description of our data and then outline a simple theoretical model that informs our estimation strategy. We then discuss our results and finally conclude.
Similarity and Cooperation
Researchers have studied firm-level effects of group diversity (Richard 2000 ) and diversity's effect on team outcomes (Townsend and Scott 2001) , but research is lacking on the subject of diversity's effect on cooperation within groups. Our goal is to expand the literature about the effects of group heterogeneity on teamwork by studying specific and measurable actions within teams.
In addition to cooperation among groups in a workplace setting, there is also research on racial heterogeneity and willingness to provide public goods (MartinezVazquez, Rider, and Walker 1997; Nelson 1990 ). Other studies (Austin 1999; Brassington 1999) look at the impact of differences in racial mix of two groups and the willingness to form a coalition (i.e. consolidate school districts, or annexing new area into a city).
Finally, a large literature has documented substantial evidence of discrimination within sports (Kahn 1991) . This setting has afforded useful insights largely because measures of productivity are easily observable. While earlier research showed substantial racial discrimination in sports settings (Kahn and Sherer 1988, Koch and Vander Hill 1988) , over recent decades, these racial gaps appear to have receded, or even disappeared (Hamilton 1997, Bodvarsson and Brastow 1999) .
This analysis of cooperation is just another form of own-race bias that has been documented in a number of other types of interaction including referee-player (Price and Wolfers 2007) , employer-employee (Stoll, Raphael, and Holzer 2004) and officeroffender (Antonovics and Knight 2004, Donohue and Levitt 2001) . What distinguishes cooperation from the other settings is that players are working together towards a common objective, while these past settings involve a more adversarial relationship.
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NBA Data
Our analysis draws on play-by-play data that we collected from espn.com for all regular season and playoff games from October 2002 to June 2008. The play level data includes an entry for every occurrence during the game that might be important for compiling game level statistics. For each shot that is completed on the court the play level data provides the name of the person who shot the basket and the person who was awarded with an assist, if the shot was assisted (about 58.85% are). Using times of substitutions in the play-by-play data, we apply recursive methods to determine the ten players on court at any given time.
Thus, for each assisted shot we know who the passer was and the set of four players would have been available to receive the pass. For each of these players we merge in information about their race, position, and other characteristics. The player race information comes from data collected by Timmerman (2000) , Kahn and Shah (2005) , Price and Wolfers (2007) and our own coding from more recent online photos of players.
Our racial coding is based on a simple measure of "black" or "not-black". Table 1 shows summary statistics from our sample. White players completed 35 percent of the shots and 25.3 percent of the passes in our sample 3 . Separating the probability that the shooter is white based on the race of the passer (as done in columns 2 and 3) provides an initial difference-in-difference estimate of any racial gaps in passing.
A white passer is 4.1 percentage points more likely to complete an assist to a white 3 These are an overestimate of the actual fraction of passes and shots made by white players because our sample is limited to observations in which there was at least one player of each race available to receive the pass. Without this restriction, white players would make 21.2% of the shots and 20.0% with is roughly in line with their representative in the NBA.
shooter relative to a black passer. 4 This simple difference-in-difference estimate fails to capture any clumping of white players on the same team (or on the court together) or differences in the positions they play.
As additional controls for our analysis, we also include information about the position the passer plays, how many years he has been on the current team, and whether or not the pass occurs during the fourth quarter of a game in which one of the teams is ahead by more than 15 points at the start of the fourth quarter (a blow-out game). White passers are less likely to be playing as a guard, have a longer tenure with their current team (3.26 years vs. 2.83 years), and are more likely to play during the fourth quarter of a blow-out game (3.19 percent compared to 3.01 percent of players).
As part of our empirical strategy, we construct identifiers for each unique group of four players that we observe on the court who are available to receive a pass on a particular play. We limit our analysis to passing opportunities in which there was at least one player of each race available to receive the pass. This eliminates about 39.6% of our observations for situations in which the four players available to receive the pass are black and another 0.31% of our observations when those four players are white.
Including these observations in our sample, would bias our estimates of own-race discrimination towards zero, since the passer in these situations has no choice about the race of the player he can pass to.
Model and Empirical Strategy
Before progressing to our empirical specification and findings, it is helpful to outline a simple economic model of cooperation. Basketball involves complex offensive and defensive strategies. For this reason, we define a simpler game that will highlight the intuition involved and suggest an empirical strategy for identifying possible same race bias in passing patterns.
Consider a game with five players. One of the five players is initially endowed with the ball. The player then passes the ball to one of the four remaining players with the best shot at the basket. We'll define S as the set of four players available for the pass.
Player i S ∈ has an opportunity for shot, the quality of which is given by i μ . Player is another player in the passer's choice set with shot quality j μ . We do not assume that i μ and j μ are independent or identically distributed. We do, however, assume that both are independent of the player passing the ball. We assume that the player with the ball passes to his teammate with the highest quality shot. Given these assumptions, the probability that the player with the ball passes to player i given the set of available passing options, S, can be written
This simple model suggests a tractable empirical specification to test the role of race in on-the-job cooperation. More specifically, suppose the set of players available to ε is distributed according to a Type 1 extreme value distribution. In this case, the probability that the ball is passed to player i is given by ( ) receive the assists includes one white player and three black players. We can estimate the following linear probability model: θ is estimated by a set of dummy variables for every combination of four players available to receive the assist. This controls non-parametrically for the probability that the white player has the best shot, taking into account the joint distribution of shot quality among all players eligible for a pass. In other words, , w S θ accounts both for the talent of every player available for a pass as well as how the players interact while on the floor together. If white and black passers are solving the same optimization problem with the same constraints, β should be statistically insignificant from zero. A non-zero coefficient suggests that the race of the passer and potential scorers affects the pattern of assists and hence on-the-job cooperation. This approach even works if there is more than one white potential recipient. In that case, the fixed effect simply estimates the probability that one of the white players has the best shot.
The disadvantage of our preferred approach is that it consumes literally tens of thousands of degrees of freedom. Thus we include separate fixed effects for sets of players that differ only by a single role-player. In doing so, we discard large amounts of potentially useful information. To the extent that we can approximate , w S θ without the inclusion of so many dummy variables, we will increase the precision of the estimated same-race bias.
To do so, we calculate the fraction of assisted baskets scored by a player while on the floor, excluding baskets in which that player made the assist. This is calculated separately for each season. For player i, we denote this probability ˆi π . One potential proxy for , w S θ is given by:
where W is the set of white players and S is the set of potential pass recipients on the court. While this measure is simple, it fails to take into account any interactions between players on the court. A symptom of this is that even if all potential pass recipients were white, the measure would almost certainly be above or below one.
For this reason, we construct a second proxy by normalizing this measure by the propensity of all players in the choice set to score off an assist. Our second proxy is given by:
2 ,ˆi
This has the advantage that if all potential pass recipients were white, the measure is constrained to equal one. It also takes into account that a player's probability of scoring depends on the skill of the other teammates on the floor. It fails to take into account, however, all of the possible idiosyncratic interactions between teammates the way our preferred approach does.
Using these two proxies, we supplement our primary findings by estimating linear probability models of the following form. Under the null hypothesis of no same race bias, we would still expect β to be close to zero.
In all specifications, we cluster correct the standard errors at the team level. This takes into account that passing decisions may not be independent across assist opportunities. For example, a particular player may consistently look to pass to a certain teammate for reasons independent of the race of the two players.
One concern with all specifications is that we have data on only completed assists.
Thus we cannot determine passes that were made that did not lead to shots, potential assists that were not converted, or the possible passing options of players who chose to shoot instead of pass. While these possibilities could affect the apparent magnitude of same race bias, they do not affect the sign of the coefficient. Suppose a player systematically passes to teammates of his own race, even though they have worse shots than teammates of another race. In this case, assists between players of the same race will be relatively more common than assists between players of differing races. This difference in assists will be less than the difference in attempted assists, however, because passes made for race based reasons will be less likely to lead to converted baskets. When players choose to score alone or make a pass to a teammate out of position to score instead of assisting to a teammate of a differing race, this also increases the relative frequency of same-race assists. Thus apparent data limitations may affect the magnitude of the observed same race bias, but our procedure still provides a valid test for the existence of same race passing preferences. Table 2 shows the results from our empirical examination using our baseline method. The first column shows our baseline specification with fixed effects for each of the four player combinations but no additional covariates. We find that the probability that the shooter is white increases by 0.82 percentage points relative to a baseline probability of 35 percentage points (or a 2.3% increase) and is not statistically significant.
Findings
Even at the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval, a white passer is only 2.2 percentage points more likely to pass to a white teammate than a black passer.
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In the second column, we include additional controls for the position of the passer. This addresses the concern that differences in the position mix between black and white players may lead to differences in passing patterns that are unrelated to preferences.
The resulting coefficients are virtually identical to the baseline estimates and if anything slightly smaller and is not statistically significant.
In the third column, we interact the race of the passer with the length of time that passer has been on the team. This tests the hypothesis that as a passer becomes more familiar with his teammates, he will show less same-race bias. The coefficient on the interaction between race and time on team is extremely small (0.23 percentage points for each year together) and is not statistically significant.
In the fourth column, we examine a set of possessions in which one team is more than fifteen points ahead of another in the fourth quarter. In such cases, because the outcome of the game is already determined, it may be the case that players are more willing to make inefficient passes to same race teammates. When we estimate our model on such a specification we find that the coefficient becomes about 8 times as large but much less precisely estimated. The coefficient indicates that, in these settings, white passers are about 6.3 percentage points more likely to pass to a white shooter. This estimate is not statistically significant and give the large standard errors we can't reject that this coefficient is the same as for the full sample. However, the results are suggestive that racial bias is more likely to emerge when the outcome of a particular task is no longer dependent on the workers decisions. Table 3 shows estimates of alternative specifications in which we approximate , w S θ as shown in equations (2) and (3). As expected, we find that our estimate of , w S θ is close to one indicating that our constructed measure is a good proxy for the probability that the shooter is white. Our test of own-race bias is based on whether deviations from this predicated probability are influenced by the race of the passer. We find no evidence of a preference by players to pass to players of their own race. Our estimate in the first column indicates that a white passer is only 0.11 percentage points more likely to pass to a white shooter (relative to our prediction based on the fraction of baskets made by the shooter in the past). This difference is even smaller when we control for the position of the passer.
In the third column, we test whether this measure of same-race bias changes as players are with the same team longer. We again find very small evidence that same-race bias increases slightly as players are with a team longer, though this difference is not statistically significant. Finally, in the fourth column, we look at the blow-out games and find a very small negative coefficient (the opposite of same-race bias) that is imprecisely estimated.
Interpretation and Conclusion
Assist patterns in the NBA exhibit very little evidence of same race bias. More specifically, given a particular set of players on the court, a white passer is no more likely to pass to a white teammate than a black passer. While this result is interesting, it is important to note why the high degree of interracial cooperation may be specific to the NBA.
In many workplace environments, the effect of same race bias in the workplace may not be immediately apparent or have little impact on the actors involved. In particular, the instances of poor interracial cooperation may not be observable by managers. Additionally, a long production process involving many workers may make it difficult to detect instances of poor interracial cooperation. The NBA differs from such instances in that player behavior is closely observed by coaches, owners, and many thousands of fans. Also, the result of poor interracial cooperation may have an immediate effect on the outcome of the game. Finally, to the extent that players derive utility from winning, they have an immediate incentive to engage in interracial cooperation.
Ultimately, our findings do not imply that efficient interracial cooperation occurs throughout the economy. They do imply, however, that interracial cooperation can occur when the incentives are well aligned for efficient cooperation. Firms may want to consider how they can alter incentives to promote efficient cooperation among a diverse workforce. Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. Information about position and years with current team refers to the passer. Blow-out game is one in which one of the teams is ahead by more than 15 points at the start of the fourth quarter. Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Each regression includes a fixed effect that controls for the set of four players on the court beside the passer (34,194 groups) . Standard errors clustered as the team level. The fourth column is restricted to passes that occur in the fourth quarter of games in which one of the teams is ahead by more than 15 points at the start of the fourth quarter. errors clustered as the team level. Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered as the team level. Our measure for θ comes from equation (3) on page 8. The fourth column is restricted to passes that occur in the fourth quarter of games in which one of the teams is ahead by more than 15 points at the start of the fourth quarter.
